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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LEE WALKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010012-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for securities fraud, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-l-21(2)(b) (1993), and 
money laundering, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 
(1990). Because defendant has not been sentenced, this Court does not have jurisdiction (see 
point I below). However, should the Court find that there is a final, appealable order, it has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider this appeal where the trial court has 
never sentenced defendant? 
1 
Standard of Review. Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which 
can be raised at any time. See Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54,116, 982 P.2d 572; Olson 
v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). 
2. Does the provision under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995) that a defendant 
may not receive a double reduction in the degree of his conviction without the prosecutor's 
consent violate the principle of separation of powers under article V, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
Standard of Review. Interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question of law which 
this Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, f 19, — Utah Adv. Rep —. 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's convictions for securities 
fraud and money laundering? 
Standard of Review. The Court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will not 
reverse a conviction unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable 
[minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a 
mistrial based on the prosecutor's question, to which an objection was sustained, as to 
whether defendant told the victim that defendant had been convicted of a felony? 
2 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial based on 
prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, 
H 18, 8 P3d 1025. 
5. Did the trial court commit plain error in not instructing the jury that it had to 
unanimously agree on the manner in which defendant committed the fraud? 
Standard of Review. To show plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that "(0 an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error in the manner by which it selected the 
alternate juror? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's removal of jurors is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Cf State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 58,20 P.3d 342 (reviewing a trial court's for-
cause dismissal of a prospective juror for an abuse of discretion), cert denied, — U.S. —, 
122 S.Ct. 542 (2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a 
determination of this case: Utah Const, art. I, § 10; Utah Const, art. V, § 1; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1 (1993); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2) (1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1990). The relevant portions of the foregoing provisions are 
reproduced in Addendum A. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged with securities fraud, a felony punishable by a fine of up to 
$20,000 and imprisonment of up to ten years, or in the alternative, communications fraud, 
a second degree felony; communications fraud, a second degree felony; theft, a second 
degree felony; and two counts of money laundering, both second degree felonies. R. 25-27. 
Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over for trial on securities 
fraud and the two money laundering counts. R. 40-42, 69, 72-73; see also R. 406-07. 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover, which the trial court denied. R. 78-88,123-25. At 
the time of trial, one of the two money laundering counts was dismissed. See R. 458-59. 
Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 425, 488-90, 495. 
The trial court stayed sentencing and instead simply placed defendant on supervised 
probation for 36 months, subject to a $ 100,000 liability in restitution to the victim. R. 477-79 
(Addendum B). Defendant appealed, but whereas the court had not sentenced defendant, this 
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because "there [was] no final, appealable 
order." R. 484, 532-33 {State v. Walker, 1999 UT App 241) C Walker I, Addendum C). 
Defendant moved for a new trial under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
moved to arrest judgment under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 539-53; see 
also R. 497-504. The trial court found that the motions were timely, but denied the relief 
requested and entered an order denying the two motions. R. 556-64. Defendant filed a 
notice of appeal one day after the 30-day appeal period expired. Compare R. 563 with R. 
4 
565. This Court also dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 578-79 (State v. 
Walker, 2000 UT App 148) (Walker 11, Addendum D).1 
On August 31, 2000, more than eighteen months after being placed on probation, 
defendant moved for a double reduction of his convictions to misdemeanors pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). R. 583-613. The trial court granted defendant's motion in 
part, reducing the securities fraud felony conviction to a class A misdemeanor and the money 
laundering conviction to a third degree felony. R. 626-28 (Addendum E); see also R. 619-25. 
The court terminated supervised probation, placing defendant on bench probation, and denied 
defendant's request to reduce the restitution amount. R. 626-28. The court, however, still 
did not sentence defendant. See R. 626-28. Defendant filed a notice of appeal twenty-three 
days later. R. 630.2 Contending that there was still no final, appealable order because 
defendant had not been sentenced, the State also moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. This Court denied the motion, holding that the amended judgment" constituted 
a final, appealable order (Addendum F). 
defendant had filed another notice of appeal nine days after the trial court entered 
an amended order submitted by defendant. R. 570-74. However, this Court concluded 
that the amended order related back to the original order and the successive notice of 
appeal did not therefore cure the untimely appeal. See R. 578-79. The Court did not 
address the State's claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction because defendant had still not 
been sentenced. 
2Two months after the notice of appeal was filed, an order that substantially 
reflected the amended judgment was also entered by the trial court. R. 636-37. 
5 
SUMMARY OF FACTS3 
In the late 1980s, defendant Lee Walker—an attorney in Las Vegas—became a patient 
of Lance Hatch, a Salt Lake City chiropractor. R. 488: 213-14. Although defendant lived 
outside Salt Lake City, he came in for visits when he was in town on business. R. 488: 213-
14. Over the course of several years, the two became friends—meeting socially and even 
operating a network marketing company together. R. 48 8:221,235. When Hatch retired and 
moved to St. George, the two stayed in touch. See R. 488: 214, 235-36. 
In October 1994, after Hatch had moved to St. George, defendant telephoned Hatch 
about an investment opportunity involving David Smith, a client of defendant's in Florida. 
R. 488: 214, 216-18, 236. He also faxed Hatch a "Memorandum of Understanding" which 
served as the investment contract for investors. R. 488: 216,223; see also R. 489: 57.4 The 
contract called for an investment of $100,000 and promised to pay the investor, through the 
sale of "Prime Bank Instruments/' an amount "equal to three point seven five (3.75) times 
his investment" within 45 days after receipt of the investment transfer. SE2 (Addendum G). 
Defendant told Hatch that the investment was "okay" and solicited Hatch's help in finding 
investors, telling him that "it wouldn't hurt anything to show people." R. 488:217,220,223; 
see also R. 489:115. When Hatch balked at the idea because the only people he could really 
3The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, f 2, 37 P.3d 1180 (citing State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 2, 994 
P.2d 1237). 
4The parties at trial stipulated that the investment contract constituted a security 
under Utah law. R. 488: 279-80. 
6 
approach were friends, defendant assured him that Smith was someone he could trust and the 
investment was, in his estimation, "okay." See R. 488: 218-20. 
After speaking with defendant, Hatch approached three of his friends about the 
investment opportunity, including his neighbor Marc Sorenson. R. 488: 214, 222. Hatch 
approached Sorenson about the investment when Sorenson came to his home to visit Hatch 
and his family. R. 489: 49; R. 488: 223. During the course of the visit, Hatch told Sorenson 
about the "lucrative" investment opportunity defendant had discussed with him. See R. 489: 
49, 51-52, 60, 106; R. 488: 223, 238. Lamenting that he did not have the money to invest 
himself, Hatch told Sorenson that he was passing the information onto him because 
defendant told him that it was a good deal and he knew defendant to be trustworthy. See R. 
489: 52,106; R. 488:223-24. Hatch reassured Sorenson that he had worked with defendant 
and that he was a "very legitimate guy." R. 489: 58. He explained that he had been 
defendant's chiropractor and that defendant had always paid his bills on time. R. 489: 58. 
Interested, Sorenson asked Hatch to explain more about the investment and to put him in 
contact with those involved. R. 489: 49, 52; R. 488: 224. 
Because defendant had also represented to Hatch that the funds needed to be received 
within a short period of time, perhaps a week, Hatch believed there was a certain urgency in 
making any investment. R. 488:226-27. Thus, after explaining the investment to Sorenson, 
Hatch telephoned defendant in Las Vegas. R. 488: 225. Hatch again sought defendant's 
assurance that the investment was sound and queried defendant whether he had looked into 
7 
it as an attorney. R. 488: 226. Hatch also obtained Smith's telephone number so that 
Sorenson could speak with Smith. See R. 488: 224. 
After his initial discussion with Hatch, Sorenson further explored the investment, 
talking with both Hatch and David Smith. R. 489: 57,119; R. 488: 241; see R. 488: 241-44. 
In telephone conversations involving Smith and Hatch, Sorenson was told that a $100,000 
investment would yield, within a short period of time, a $275,000 return on top of the initial 
investment. See R. 489:49,51-52. Smith and Hatch explained that Walid Summa, a foreign 
national living in Michigan, wanted to transfer one billion dollars into Bear Steams & 
Company, Inc. R. 489: 50,119; SE1&2. They explained, however, that the funds could not 
be legally transferred to the Bear Steams account directly and thus a secondary account of 
at least $500,000 was required for investors. R. 489: 66-67. Smith gave Sorenson firm 
assurances that his $100,000 investment would be safe and that he would receive a return on 
his investment as promised. R. 489: 112. 
Sorenson also spoke with defendant in a conference-type call with Hatch. R. 489: 54-
55, 102; R. 488: 228-29. During that call, the three reviewed the investment contract. R. 
488: 228-29.5 Hatch and Sorenson also asked defendant whether the contract was legal and 
whether it was "something that would be advisable to get involved in for Mr. Sorenson." R. 
488: 229. Defendant vouched for Smith's credibility, calling him "a legitimate credible 
investment guru," and represented that "this was probably a, a viable situation[—t]hat this 
5Sorenson testified that defendant did not explain the investment opportunity—he 
did not discuss Walid Summa's role or the return Sorenson should expect to receive, nor 
did he offer to sell Sorenson a security. R. 489: 102-03, 114. 
8 
investment was okay." R.489:113; R. 488:229. He explained that Smith had been involved 
in many such investment transactions, that he and Smith had been together for some time, 
and that he could therefore vouch for his credibility. R. 489: 55-56. 
Although defendant had been sentenced to prison for a criminal contempt conviction 
relating to a securities violation, and was subject to a permanent injunction enjoining him 
from "engaging in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security," he did not disclose these facts to either Sorenson or Hatch. See R. 489: 98-100; 
R. 488: 233. At trial, the State's expert witness testified that such legal action is important 
information to the average investor in making a decision to invest. See R. 488: 285-86,293, 
295-96. Hatch concurred, also explaining that had he known about it, he would have 
disclosed it to Sorenson. R. 488: 233, 250. 
After speaking with Smith and defendant, Sorenson signed the investment contract 
pledging the transfer of $100,000 to the accounts of Bear Stearns and David Smith. R. 489: 
57-60; SE1&2.6 Hatch suggested that Sorenson transfer the funds through defendant's trust 
account in Las Vegas. R. 489: 60, 114; R. 488: 231. He reasoned that defendant's 
willingness to use his trust account in this way would (1) add assurance that the investment 
was legitimate, and (2) ensure that the funds were properly transferred. See R. 489: 60,114; 
6Sorenson actually signed two investment contracts. R. 489: 47-48, 57. The latter, 
which was signed two days after the first, directed that the $100,000 investment be 
distributed as follows: $50,000 to the Bear Stearns account in New York and $50,000 to 
David Smith's account in Palm Beach. Compare SE1 with SE2. 
9 
R. 488: 231, 245, 247. When this transfer was arranged, defendant told Hatch "that this 
whole thing had better be good because he didn't have enough malpractice insurance to cover 
the problem." R. 488: 245. On October 18, 1994, Sorenson transferred $100,000 to 
defendant's trust account, whereupon $50,000 was transferred to Smith's account in Florida 
and $50,000 was transferred to the Bear Stearns account in New York. R. 489: 58-60; R. 
488: 301-02. 
Unbeknownst to Sorenson, "there [i]s no such thing" as prime bank instruments and 
"any use of them [is] illegitimate and fraudulent." R. 490: 468, 477-78. Indeed, their 
emergence in the early 1980s prompted the Federal Reserve Board in October 1993 to issue 
a public alert warning against the use of such fraudulent instruments. R. 490: 481-83. The 
high rate of return promised is generally a distinct clue to potential investors that the 
investment is in fact "too good to be true." See R. 490: 480. 
Not surprisingly, Sorenson never received any of the promised payments, losing his 
entire investment. See R. 488:311. Sorenson repeatedly attempted to contact defendant for 
an explanation, but defendant never returned his calls. R. 489: 62-63. Sorenson was able 
to talk to two men from New York who acknowledged receipt of $50,000, but that contact 
proved fruitless. R. 489: 61; R. 488: 311. Sorenson later learned that the day after the 
$50,000 transfer into Smith's account, which theretofore had a zero balance, Smith drew a 
check from the account for $34,782.95 for the purchase of a Jeep Cherokee. R. 489: 103; R. 
488: 305-06. Despite an investigation, disbursement of the funds transferred into the Bear 
Stearns account could not be traced. R. 488: 302. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Jurisdiction. Defendant has never been sentenced. This Court dismissed 
defendant's first appeal because defendant had not been sentenced. Nearly sixteen months 
after the Court dismissed the first appeal, the trial court entered an "Amended Judgment" to 
reduce the degree of the original convictions. However, the court still did not sentence 
defendant. Because the sentence is the final order from which a defendant may appeal his 
conviction, this Court lacks jurisdiction and should dismiss the appeal. 
II. Constitutionality of Section 76-3-402. Defendant claims that because section 
76-3-402 permits a trial court to reduce a conviction by two degrees only if the prosecutor 
assents thereto, it violates the principle of separation of powers. However, defendant's 
argument is wholly devoid of legal analysis. He does not discuss Utah's constitutional 
provision governing the distribution of governmental powers, he does not discuss Utah case 
law addressing that provision, he does not discuss the decisions of other jurisdictions, and 
he does not explain why the statute violates the separation of powers doctrine. Because 
defendant has not adequately briefed the issue, this Court should decline to review it. 
Nevertheless, a review of Utah case law addressing the separation of powers doctrine reveals 
that section 76-3-402 does not violate the Utah Constitution. 
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of securities fraud and money laundering. However, when the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, it cannot be said that the 
evidence was insufficient. Defendant, an attorney, invited his long-time friend to find people 
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to invest in an investment opportunity involving one of his clients. He also faxed his friend 
a form investment contract which promised a 375% return in 45 days involving the sale of 
"Prime Bank Instruments." When his friend balked at the idea, defendant assured him that 
his client could be trusted and reiterated that the investment was "okay." The friend 
approached the victim in this case about the investment opportunity and arranged a telephone 
conversation with defendant. During the conference call, the three reviewed the investment 
contract. The friend and victim asked defendant whether the contract was legal and whether 
it was an advisable investment. Defendant again vouched for his client's credibility and 
represented that it was probably a viable investment. When the victim agreed to make the 
investment, defendant allowed the funds to be transferred through his trust account and 
acknowledged that he would be responsible. Unbeknownst to the victim, there is no such 
thing as a "Prime Bank Instrument" and any use of them is illegitimate. Defendant also 
failed to disclose that he was subject to a permanent injunction restricting his involvement 
in securities transactions and that he had previously been sentenced to prison for a criminal 
contempt conviction relating to a securities violation—facts which would be important to the 
average investor. These facts support the jury's verdict. 
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant claims that the prosecutor's question to 
the victim as to whether or not defendant had ever told him that he had been convicted of a 
felony constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal. While defendant's conviction 
was not a felony, any possible prejudice was cured when the prosecutor rephrased the 
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question after defendant's objection. The trial court did not therefore abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion for a mistrial. 
V. Jury Unanimity. Defendant claims that the trial court failed to properly instruct 
the jury on the requirement of unanimity. Because defendant did not object to the 
instructions before they were read to the jury, he cannot prevail on appeal absent plain error. 
He has shown no error, much less plain error. The instructions as a whole can be fairly read 
to require the unanimity defendant contends the law requires. To the extent the instructions 
were insufficient, that insufficiency was not obvious. Moreover, under the Sullivan rule, the 
jury was not required to be unanimous in the manner in which defendant committed security 
fraud, as alleged by defendant. 
VI. Alternate Juror. Defendant contends that the trial court did not comply with the 
rules of criminal procedure when he designated the third juror in order as the alternate juror, 
rather than the ninth juror in order. However, this Court need not address whether or not the 
trial court departed from the rules because defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice. 
Defendant has not alleged on appeal that any member of the jury was partial or that the trial 
court acted with improper motives. Moreover, defendant passed the jury and the alternate 
juror for cause at trial. This Court will not reverse a jury conviction where, as here, the 
alleged error is harmless. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS 
APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT SENTENCED 
DEFENDANT 
The Court has already denied a previously filed motion by the State to dismiss this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Order (Addendum F). However, because "a lack of 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the court," Olson v. Salt Lake City 
School District, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986), the State renews its claim that the Court 
lacks jurisdiction and urges the Court to revisit the issue. 
* * * 
"In criminal cases, the sentence itself is the final judgment from which an appeal can 
be taken." State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah App. 1997) (per curiam). 
Accordingly, until the trial court sentences a defendant, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider any claim on appeal because there is no final, appealable order. See State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) (holding that "[i]t is the sentence itself which 
constitutes a final judgment from which [an] appellant has the right to appeal"). 
Dismissal of First Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. Although a jury convicted 
defendant of securities fraud and money laundering, R. 425, the trial court did not sentence 
defendant. Instead, the court entered the following judgment: 
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JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I: 
SECURITIES FRAUD, a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $20,000 
and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years and COUNT II, MONEY 
LAUNDERING, a second degree felony. 
STAY OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
imposition of any sentence in this matter is stayed. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said 
Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is hereby placed on supervised probation for 
a period of thirty-six (36) months, strictly within the following terms, 
provisions and conditions: 
1. That the Defendant be liable for One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($ 100,000) in restitution to Marc Sorenson jointly and severally with any other 
defendant convicted of a crime in connection with the fraudulent activities 
resulting in the loss of Marc Sorenson's money; provided that, the Defendant 
shall not be required to pay any money toward restitution until after any trial 
and sentencing of any convicted defendants; 
2. That the Defendant cooperate fully with Adult Probation and Parole; 
3. That the Defendant have no business activities involving the sale of 
securities and that the Defendant not participate in any manner in any 
transaction involving the offer or sale of securities to any third person; and 
4. The Defendant have no law violations. 
R. 477-79 (emphasis added). 
Defendant appealed, but this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 
532-33 (Walker I, Addendum C). Relying on Hunsaker and Gerrard, this Court held that 
"[bjecause Walker ha[d] not been sentenced, there is no final, appealable order, and [the 
Court thus] lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider his appeal." Id. The Court's dismissal of 
defendant's first appeal was without prejudice, thereby permitting defendant to file "a new, 
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timely notice of appeal after the trial court enters a final appealable order. Id, (emphasis 
added). 
Amended Judgment: No Sentence Imposed. One year later, defendant moved for a 
reduction in his convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). R. 583-613. The trial 
court granted defendant's motion in part, amending the original "judgment" as follows: 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I: 
SECURITIES FRAUD, a class A misdemeanor and COUNT II: MONEY 
LAUNDERING, a third degree felony. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
supervised probation is terminated and that Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is 
hereby placed on bench probation for the balance of the original thirty-six 
month term under the following conditions: 
1. That the Defendant commit no law violations; and 
2. That the Defendant pay restitution as previously ordered, until the 
issue of restitution is resolved. 
R. 627 {see Walker II, Addendum D). Defendant appeals from this "Amended Judgment," 
claiming error in both the trial court's partial grant of the motion for reduced convictions, 
Aplt. Brf. at 19-24, and the trial proceedings, Aplt. Brf. at 24-46. 
As in the first judgment, the trial court did not sentence defendant. Neither did the 
court sentence defendant in the interim. Accordingly, this Court still lacks jurisdiction to 
consider defendant's appeal. See R. 533, Walker I (holding that because sentence had not 
been imposed, the Court "ha[s] no alternative but to dismiss Walker's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction"); see also Hunsaker, 933 P.2d at 416. 
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The failure of the trial court to impose any sentence stems from that court's apparent 
misunderstanding of its sentencing obligations and probation authority. After the dismissal 
of the first appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, defendant moved for a new trial and 
to arrest judgment. R. 539-53. In rejecting the State's claim that the motions were untimely, 
the trial court frankly acknowledged "that '[Defendant] has not been sentenced.'" R. 
558-59 (emphasis added) (Addendum H). The trial court noted and rejected the prosecutor's 
argument that the "court's order staying the imposition of sentence was, in spite of the clear 
language of the order, actually the imposition of sentence." R. 557-58. The court instead 
concluded that it was not required to sentence defendant. R. 557-59. The court explained 
that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (1995) "gives the [trial] [c]ourt discretion to suspend 
imposition of sentence and place a defendant on probation without imposing sentence " 
R. 557 (emphasis added). The court concluded that section 77-18-1 was in conflict with rule 
22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the trial court to impose sentence 
and enter a judgment of conviction after a verdict. R. 558. However, the court "assume[d] 
that the conflict between the rule and the statute was inadvertent," and thus "interpreted] 
Rule 22(c) to mean that the Court 'shall impose sentence or order a suspension of the 
imposition of sentence.'" R. 558-59 (emphasis added).7 
7The trial court ultimately denied the motions, but again took no action to sentence 
defendant. See R. 556-61. Defendant attempted to appeal, but this Court dismissed that 
appeal because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. R. 578-79 (Walker II, 
Addendum D). Under Walker I, however, dismissal of the second appeal was also 
required because there was still no final, appealable order. 
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The trial court misinterpreted the law. As conceded by the trial court, rule 22(c) 
provides that "[u]pon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, 
if any, and the sentence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (emphasis added). This requirement is 
consistent with the mandates of the Criminal Code, which provides that "[a] person adjudged 
guilty of an offense under th[e] code shall be sentenced" as provided by law. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-101(1) (1999) (emphasis added). Once sentence has been imposed, section 77-
18-1 permits the court to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (1999). When read this way, no 
conflict exists between the rule and the statute. Indeed, this is the only reasonable 
interpretation of the two provisions. A sentence cannot be suspended until first it has been 
imposed. The foregoing procedure is consistent with the standard practice of Utah courts. 
See, e.g., State v. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, f 2,15 P.3d 110 (sentencing defendant "to one 
to fifteen years in prison for the aggravated assault and six months in county jail on the other 
charges, but suspending] the sentence, ordering that defendant serve 36 months probation 
and pay restitution to his victim for her counseling and associated costs"); State v. Kenison, 
2000 UT App 322, f 4,14 P.3d 129 ("sentencing] defendant to not more than five years in 
prison on each count, but suspending] his incarceration, ordering instead that defendant be 
confined to the Salt Lake County jail for nine months and that he then be placed on probation 
for 36 months"); State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App.) (sentencing defendants to 
jail, but suspending their sentences pending successful completion of probation), cert. 
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denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997); State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1985) 
(sentencing defendant to a prison term, but suspending execution thereof and placing 
defendant on probation); State v. Dowell, 517 P.2d 1016, 1016 (Utah 1974) (sentencing 
defendant to maximum prison term, but suspending her sentence and placing her on 
probation). 
When the trial court entered an "Amended Judgment," it did not depart from its 
previously stated position. The court never sentenced defendant, but simply granted 
defendant's motion for a reduction in the degree of his convictions and terminated supervised 
probation. See R. 626-28. Because the court did not sentence defendant, there is still no 
final order from which defendant may appeal. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 886. Accordingly, 
as with the first appeal, this appeal should be dismissed "without prejudice to the filing of 
a new, timely notice of appeal after the trial court enters a final appealable order." See R. 
533 {Walker I). In the event this Court finds it has jurisdiction, defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed for the reasons below. 
II. 
SECTION 76-3-402fs PROVISION THAT A DEFENDANT MAY NOT 
RECEIVE A DOUBLE-REDUCTION IN THE DEGREE OF HIS 
CONVICTION WITHOUT THE PROSECUTOR'S CONSENT DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Section 76-3-402 provides that upon a defendant's conviction, the trial court may, 
under defined circumstances, "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995)(1). Section 
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76-3-402 also provides that "[a]n offense may be reduced only one degree under this section 
unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3) (1995). On appeal, defendant 
asks this Court to consider whether this latter provision requiring the prosecutor's consent 
for a double reduction violates the principle of separation of powers. 
A, DEFENDANT HAS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THE ISSUE. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument "contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented." Thus, 
"rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority 
and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998); accord State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 27, 989 P.2d 503. In other words, 
parties may not treat the appellate court '"simply [as] a depository in which [a] party may 
dump the burden of argument and research/" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Willamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981)). Yet, that is 
exactly what defendant does here. 
Defendant's argument expends some four pages in quoting nearly the entire trial court 
decision refusing to grant more than a single reduction in the degree of his convictions. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 19-22; see also R. 619-24 (memorandum decision, Addendum I). Following the 
lengthy recitation of the trial court's decision, defendant gives a superficial overview of such 
general concepts as the "rule of law," "structural independence," "decisional independence," 
and the need for judicial independence. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. He then concludes his argument 
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by "requesting] that this Court review this issue and consider how it pertains to the principle 
of the separation of powers in the Utah Judiciary." Aplt. Brf. at 24. This is the extent of 
defendant's argument. He does not explain how section 76-3-402 violates the general 
concepts of structural, decisional, or judicial independence. He does not identify or discuss 
article V of the Utah Constitution—the constitutional provision that defines the distribution 
of powers in Utah government. He does not cite to or discuss any decisions from this Court 
or the Utah Supreme Court which address article V or the principle of separation of powers 
in Utah government. Nor does he discuss the decisions of other jurisdictions touching this 
subject. In short, defendant's argument is "devoid of legal analysis" on the issue, see State 
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247,249 (Utah App. 1992), but nevertheless invites the Court to determine 
on its own "how it pertains to the principle of the separation of powers in the Utah 
Judiciary," Aplt. Brf. at 24. 
At best, defendant's brief can be read as adopting the conclusions of the Arizona and 
California cases cited favorably by the trial court below. See R. 621-23 (discussing State v. 
Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App. 1984); State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1989); and 
People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1990)). In those decisions, the Arizona and California 
courts concluded that statutes permitting reduced sentences only at the invitation of the 
prosecutor violated the doctrine of separation of powers under their respective state 
constitutions. See Prentiss, 786 P.2d at 936 (rejecting such statutes under the rationale that 
"the legislature cannot, through an executive agent, restrict the judiciary from deciding what 
a sentence should be"); Jones, 689 P.2d at 563 (holding that "the decision to mitigate a 
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sentence properly belongs to the judge and not the prosecutor"); Tenorio, 473 P.2d at 996-97 
(holding that a recidivist statute that permitted a court to disregard a prior conviction only at 
the bidding of the prosecutor improperly infringed on the judiciary's sentencing discretion). 
Defendant, however, does not explain why the rationale of those courts should be applied in 
Utah. He also fails to recognize the holdings of other jurisdictions which would suggest that 
section 76-3-402 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., United States 
v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that federal statute permitting downward 
departure from minimum sentence only upon motion of the prosecutor does riot violate the 
separation of powers doctrine), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 845 (1990); State v. 
Pierce, 657 A.2d 192 (Vt 1995) (holding that statute conditioning any deferral of a criminal 
sentence on the prosecutor's approval does not violate separation of powers doctrine); State 
v. Gonzalez, 603 A.2d 516 (NJ. Super.Ct.App. 1992) (holding that statute permitting waiver 
of mandatory sentence only upon prosecutor's approval does not violate separation of powers 
doctrine). In short, his argument contains no analysis explaining why this Court should adopt 
the conclusions of Arizona and California. 
Defendant also fails to address the "serious doubts" of the trial court "as to the 
viability of the separation of powers principle" in light of recent Utah cases. See R. 623. 
Although the trial court found that the rationale of the Arizona and California courts was 
"very sound and persuasive," it refused to find that section 76-3-402 violated the separation 
of powers doctrine under the Utah Constitution. R. 623. 
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Where a party fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal, this Court has routinely 
declined to consider that issue. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); 
accord Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304. Defendant has not adequately briefed the separation of 
powers issue, neither discussing Utah's jurisprudence on the subject nor explaining why the 
Court should adopt the conclusions of Arizona and California. Because his brief "wholly 
lacks legal analysis," State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989), this Court should 
decline to address defendant's claim. 
B. SECTION 76-3-402 DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim, it would fail on its merits. 
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Const, art. V, § 1. "The first [clause] states the general separation of powers principle, 
and the second very specifically prohibits the exercise of certain functions of one branch by 
one charged with the exercise of certain powers of another branch." In re Young, 1999 UT 
6,atf 7,976P.2d581. 
The Utah Supreme Court applies the following three-step inquiry in determining 
whether a statute violates the constitution's separation of powers principle: 
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First, [is the person] in question "charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to" one of the three branches of government? Second, is 
the function that the statute has given the [person] one "appertaining to" 
another branch of government? The third and final step in the analysis asks: 
if the answer to both of the above questions is "yes," does the constitution 
"expressly" direct or permit exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If 
not, article V, section 1 is transgressed. 
In re Young, 1999 UT 6, at f 8. The Supreme Court has concluded that "for powers or 
functions to fall within the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1, they must be 'so 
inherently legislative, executive or judicial in character that they must be exercised 
exclusively by their respective departments/" Id. at f 14 (quoting Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 
302, 315, 226 P.2d 531, 537 (Utah 1951)) (emphasis added). In other words, "when the 
power exercised or the function performed is one tha t . . . is not exclusive to a branch, it is 
not 'appertaining to' that branch and does not fall within the reach of the second clause of 
article V, section 1." Id. Because "there are many cases in which the duties of one 
department are to a certain extent devolved upon and shared by the other," In re Young, 1999 
UT 6, at Tf 13 (internal quotes omitted), the critical question in most inquiries is the 
second—whether the powers or functions delegated in the statute "appertain[] to" a different 
branch of government. 
In this case, the question is whether the prosecutor's role in approving a double-
reduction in the degree of a defendant's conviction is so inherently judicial in character that 
it must be exercised exclusively by the judiciary. See In re Young, 1999 UT 6, at \ 14. Even 
a brief review of cases from this and other jurisdictions suggests that the prosecutor's role 
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under section 76-3-402 is not so inherently judicial in nature that it may only be exercised 
by the courts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that no one other than a duly appointed judge can 
enter final judgments or impose sentence. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848, 851 
(Utah 1994). This is so because "[t]he power to execute sentences remains in the exclusive 
control of the judiciary." Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664,668 (Utah 1997) 
(emphasis added). That said, however, all matters pertaining to sentencing do not reside with 
the judiciary. "[T]he power to fix sentencing limits and the power to suspend sentence in 
favor of probation are not inherent in the judiciary but must be authorized by statute." State 
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,464 (Utah 1988); accord Padilla, 947 P.2d at 668-69 (holding that 
judiciary's power to execute sentences is circumscribed by statutory limitations). As 
observed by the United States Supreme Court in reference to federal sentencing, "the 
function of determining the scope and extent of punishment [ ] never has been thought to be 
assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches 
of Government." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364, 109 S.Ct. 647, 650-51 
(1989). Thus, the legislature may fix virtually any punishment "and leave no discretion 
whatever in the courts as to the extent or degree of punishment." State v. Bishop, 1X1 P.2d 
261, 264 (Utah 1986) (quoting Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 250, 170 P. 67, 68 (1917)). 
Traditionally, the prosecutor plays a substantial role in deciding a defendant's 
exposure in sentencing. "For example, the prosecutor determines the extent of a suspect's 
sentencing exposure by deciding whether to file charges, what charges to file, whether to 
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request the dismissal of charges, [ ] whether to charge prior convictions for purposes of 
determining a defendant's habitual criminality," and whether to plea bargain. People v. 
R. W. V., 942 P.2d 1317,1320 (Colo. App. 1997); accord Pierce, 163 Vt. at 196, 657 A.2d at 
195. 
As noted above, section 76-3-402 allows the trial court to "enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). Section 76-3-402 also permits a double-reduction if the 
prosecutor agrees. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3). Section 76-3-402 thus broadens the 
discretion of the trial court at sentencing. In conditioning a double-reduction on the assent 
of the prosecutor, the statute does not sanction an impermissible intrusion into the Judiciary 
by the Executive. The prosecutor does not impose sentence. That role remains with the 
court, which is not required to accept the recommendation of the prosecutor. Indeed, before 
a court grants a double-reduction, it still must conclude that the normal sentence would be 
"unduly harsh" after considering "the nature and circumstances of the offense" and the 
"history and character of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). Thus, while the 
statute takes away some of the prosecutor's ability to determine a defendant's sentencing 
exposure, it preserves that role as to any double-reduction in conviction and sentencing. 
Accordingly, no separation of powers violation is present. 
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C. SHOULD THIS COURT FIND THAT THE DOUBLE-REDUCTION REQUIREMENT 
VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE, IT SHOULD BE SEVERED. 
Even if this Court were to find that the double-reduction requirement violated the 
separation of powers principle under the Utah Constitution, the trial court would have no 
authority to reduce a conviction by two degrees. "The general rule is 'that statutes, where 
possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion 
of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should be 
done.'" State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, f 18,980 P.2d 191 (quoting Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293,1299 (Utah 1982)). A review of the statute reveals 
that even if paragraph (3) of the statute is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the 
statute should be saved by severing paragraph (3). However, paragraph (3) itself could not 
be severed in piecemeal fashion to allow a double reduction without the prosecutor's consent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that in determining whether an unconstitutional 
subsection is severable, the appellate courts look to legislative intent. Id. at f 19. "If the 
intent is not expressly stated, [the courts] then turn to the statute itself, and examine the 
remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the 
remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the 
statute will be allowed to stand." Id. The Court thus engages in a two-part inquiry. First, 
the court must determine if the remaining provisions of the statute are constitutional standing 
alone. Second, the Court must determine if the remaining provisions still further the 
legislative purpose of the statute. The second inquiry focuses on "whether the legislature 
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would have passed the statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the parts are 
so dependent upon each other that the court should conclude the intention was that the statute 
be effective only in its entirety." Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm fn, 885 P.2d 759,779 
(Utah 1994). 
Although the legislative intent is not expressed in section 76-3-402, an examination 
of the statute itself reveals that it remains "operable and still furthers the intended legislative 
purpose." Id. If paragraph (3) providing for a double reduction is severed, the statute 
authorizes trial courts to "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense 
and impose sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1). As noted above, the law 
is well settled that the legislature may define the offense and fix the punishment. Indeed, the 
legislature may choose to "leave no discretion whatever in the courts as to the extent or 
degree of punishment." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 264 (quoting Mutart, 51 Utahat250,170P.at 
68). Thus, after severing paragraph (3), it is clear that the remainder of the statute, which 
simply broadens the authority of the trial court's in entering a conviction and executing a 
sentence, remains operable. Moreover, the statute as severed "still furthers [its] intended 
legislative purpose"—giving the trial courts greater latitude to impose a more lenient 
punishment when the circumstances so justify. 
That said, however, paragraph (3) may not be severed in piecemeal fashion to allow 
a double reduction in sentencing without the prosecutor's consent. Although the legislature 
could assuredly do so constitutionally, a fair reading of the statute makes it clear that the 
legislature believed that a double reduction would only be justified if the prosecutor—who 
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is charged with the enforcement of the law—agreed to such a reduction. In other words, the 
legislature would not have given trial courts the authority to grant a double reduction based 
on their own review of the circumstances. Accordingly, if this Court were to find that 
paragraph (3) is unconstitutional, the trial court would only be left with the authority to 
reduce a conviction by one degree, not two.8 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTIONS 
In his next claim on appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of securities fraud and money laundering. Aplt. Brf. at 24-33. This claim fails. 
This Court's review of the evidence is limited. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,233 
(Utah 1992). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Id. Defendant, 
In that event, because defendant actually received a double reduction in the degree 
of his securities fraud conviction, this Court would be required to remand to the trial 
court. Although the securities fraud statute for which defendant was convicted was not 
divided into a third and second degree felony, it was in fact divided into two different and 
separate degrees (roughly analogous to a third and second degree felony). Where the 
value of the property sought to be obtained was $10,000 or less, a violation of the statute 
was punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment of not more than 
five years. Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-21(2)(a) (1993). If it was more than $10,000, a 
violation was punishable by a fine of not more than $20,000 and imprisonment of not 
more than ten years. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-21 (2)(b) (1993). Defendant was tried and 
convicted for the higher degree of securities fraud. See R. 406. Accordingly, a single 
reduction would have resulted in the entering of a conviction for the securities fraud 
violation punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of not more than five 
years. The trial court's entry of a conviction for a class A misdemeanor thus constituted a 
double reduction in the offense. Accordingly, defendant is in no case entitled to a further 
reduction in sentencing and may have received a greater reduction than the law permits if 
the provision is deemed unconstitutional. 
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therefore, bears a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Shepherd, 
1999 UT App 305, atf 25. He must first "'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict."' State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. 
Fire Ins, Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)); accord Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 
atf 25. 
The Court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will not reverse a conviction 
unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable [people] could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 
231 (Utah 1980). In other words, defendant must overcome the formidable burden of 
showing that the evidence "'was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to 
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, % 19, 999 
P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)). 
A. SECURITIES FRAUD: DEFENDANT FAILS TO MEET THE MARSHALING 
REQUIREMENT. 
In claiming that the State's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for 
securities fraud, defendant challenges only the evidence establishing that he committed the 
crime willfully. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. He argues, in essence, that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that he was a knowing and willing participant in the securities 
transaction. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. As noted, defendant must first marshal all the evidence 
in support of the verdict. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^  14. The appellate court will not entertain 
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the merits of an insufficiency claim if a defendant fails to meet the marshaling requirement. 
See State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604,607-08 (Utah App. 1994). Instead, the Court will assume 
the evidence supported the verdict. See Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 30, 979 P.2d 338. 
Defendant fails to meet his threshold burden of marshaling the evidence. 
Defendant only acknowledges evidence that defendant knew his client and believed 
him to be credible. Aplt. Brf. at 25. He acknowledges no other evidence establishing that 
his conduct was willful. He does not acknowledge in his argument that he called his friend 
Lance Hatch about the investment opportunity and faxed him the investment contract form. 
See R. 488: 214-18, 223, 236. He ignores the evidence that he solicited Hatch's help in 
finding investors. See R. 488: 217, 220, 223; R. 489: 115. He ignores the testimony that 
when Hatch balked at the idea of approaching his friends about the investment, defendant 
told him the investment was "okay." R. 488: 218-20. He also fails to acknowledge that he 
reviewed the terms of the contract on the telephone with both Hatch and Mr. Sorenson. See 
R. 488: 228-29. He ignores the testimony that he told Hatch that it was a good deal. See R. 
489: 5, 106; R. 488: 223-24. He also ignores evidence that he told Hatch that an urgency 
existed to obtain the investment—that "there was only about a week to get it all done." R. 
488: 226-27. Finally, he ignores evidence that he told Hatch and Sorenson that he and Smith 
had been together for some time. R. 489: 55-56. The foregoing evidence was more than 
sufficient to support a finding that defendant willfully participated in the securities 
transaction—he initiated the search for investors, he was aware of the terms of the 
investment, he gave his opinion that it was viable and "okay," and he repeatedly assured both 
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Hatch and Sorenson that Smith could be trusted. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 
(Utah 1993) (holding that State need only prove that defendant "acted 'willfully' in 
misstating or omitting material facts" and that proof of "scienter" is not required). 
Notwithstanding that evidence, defendant fails to acknowledge it. He does not 
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order," the evidence at trial which supports the 
verdict. See West Valley City v. Majestic In v. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Instead, he only provides a scintilla of evidence showing willfulness and questions the 
materiality of his omissions, the testimony regarding the fraudulent nature of "prime bank 
instruments," and the alleged misstatements by the prosecutor—matters that do not go to his 
wilfulness. 
In short, defendant has made almost no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting 
the verdict. Counsel has not, as required, "extricate[d] himself... from the client's shoes 
and fully assumefd] the adversary's position," presenting "every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial" which supports the jury verdict. See Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1315. Only 
after doing so can defendant demonstrate the "fatal flaw" in the evidence. Id. Because 
defendant has not met the marshaling requirement, this Court must assume the evidence 
supported the verdict and should decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim. See 
Young, 1999 UT 3 8 4 30. 
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B. MONEY LAUNDERING: DEFENDANT FAILS TO MEET THE MARSHALING 
REQUIREMENT. 
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the money 
laundering conviction. See Aplt. Brf. at 28-33. However, just as his challenge to the 
securities fraud conviction does not meet the marshaling requirement, so too does his 
challenge to the money laundering conviction fall short of the marshaling requirement. 
In his challenge to the money laundering conviction, defendant disputes the 
sufficiency of the evidence showing that he knew illegal investment proceeds were being 
funneled through his bank account. See Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. Defendant asserts that he was 
largely unaware of the transfer of funds through his account and that he had no reason to 
know the transaction was illegal. However, he wholly fails to marshal the evidence 
supporting the State's case. Instead, he simply argues that he was "forced into a surety 
situation without his knowledge, or consent, by the victim himself." Aplt. Brf. at 29. 
In the first instance, defer dant ignores the reasonable inference that Hatch received 
defendant's bank account coordinates for the transfer from defendant himself. As discussed 
above, the evidence showed that the two were working together to find investors. It is thus 
reasonable to infer that defendant gave Hatch the necessary coordinates to facilitate the 
transaction. Moreover, defendant wholly ignores Hatch's testimony that when the transfer 
was arranged, defendant told him "that this whole thing had better be good because he didn't 
have enough malpractice insurance to cover the problem." R. 488: 245. In other words, 
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defendant was well aware of his role in the transaction and was well aware that his 
participation to facilitate the transaction would subject him to liability. 
Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of defendant's 
conviction for money laundering, and in light of the substantial evidence demonstrating 
defendant's knowing participation, this Court should decline to consider the merits of 
defendant's claim. See Young, 1999 UT 38, f 30. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's question of Mr. Sorenson as to whether defendant had 
told him that he had been convicted of a felony. Aplt. Brf. at 33-34.9 
9Defendant also baldly asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by arguing in closing that defendant's injunction, previous conviction, and 
prison sentence demonstrated that he was a bad person. Aplt. Brf. at 34. Defendant, 
however, does not discuss the language used by the prosecutor, explain why the argument 
was improper, or explain how it resulted in prejudice. See Aplt. Brf. at 34-39. This Court 
should not therefore address the issue. See Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549. Moreover, defendant 
did not object to the alleged improper argument. See R. 495: 48-49. "Because defense 
counsel did not object to the comments when they occurred, defendant must show plain 
error on appeal." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App.) (citing Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1208), cert denied, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1998). Where he has failed to even 
attempt to show why the remarks were improper, he cannot prevail under a plain error 
analysis. A review of the remarks nevertheless reveals that they were not improper. 
Moreover, the trial court fully instructed the jury on the limited purpose for considering 
the conviction and injunction. See R. 437-39. Defendant also did not explain how he was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks regarding a prison sentence. 
The court should therefore also decline to address that issue. 
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"Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact on 
the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion based 
on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 
276 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, f 18, 8 P.3d 1025. In reviewing a claim 
of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls to 
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in reaching the 
verdict and, if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced 
the jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent the misconduct." State 
v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988). To meet the prejudice prong of the inquiry, "the 
error [must be] substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Harmon, 956 
P.2d at 276. (internal quotes and citations omitted). In other words, "[u]nless a review of the 
record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely 
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [the Court] will 
not find that the [trial] court's decision was an abuse of discretion." State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997); accord Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276. 
In this case, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's question so prejudiced defendant 
that he was denied a fair trial. It is undisputed that the prosecutor asked Mr. Sorenson 
whether defendant indicated that "he had ever been convicted of a felony." See R. 489: 98. 
It is also undisputed that no evidence was ever introduced that defendant was convicted of 
a felony. However, the prosecutor never attempted to make a felony conviction the focus of 
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the case and thus his inadvertent reference to a felony conviction could not have affected the 
outcome of the trial. 
The State introduced evidence that defendant had been convicted of a criminal 
contempt charge involving a securities violation and that he was subject to a permanent 
injunction restricting participation in securities transactions. See R. 488:189-90; SE6 & SE7 
(Addendum G). This evidence was used to establish that defendant failed to disclose 
material facts. The State's expert witness testified that such information was important to 
the average investor in making a decision to invest. R.488: 285-86,293-96. In other words, 
it was the State's theory at trial that defendant's failure to disclose this information to Mr. 
Sorenson constituted a material omission—an element necessary to prove the State's case. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). The focus of the information was not that defendant was 
convicted of a felony or even of a crime, but that he failed to disclose information that was 
important to the average investor. In short, the prosecutor never focused on the fact of a 
felony—the remark was inadvertent and inconsequential in light of the State's overall case. 
Moreover, defendant promptly objected to the characterization of the conviction, and 
after a short side bar, defense counsel stated before the jury "that the question assumed facts 
not in evidence" and that there was "no evidence" of such a conviction. R. 489: 99-100. The 
trial court stated that that was "correct" and that "[tjhere is no evidence whether there was 
anything to disclose at this point." R. 489: 100. The prosecutor then asked whether 
defendant had uindicate[d] whether he had ever been convicted of a crime of any kind," to 
which Sorenson replied that defendant had not. R. 489: 100. This exchange made it clear 
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to the jury that there was no evidence of a felony conviction. Moreover, as explained, the 
relevance of this information came to light later in the trial. The true character and 
importance of the conviction was revealed to the jury when the judgment was admitted into 
evidence and when the State's expert testified as to the importance of the information to an 
average investor. In short, nothing was made of the felony. 
Because the focus of the State's case was never on the fact of a "felony" conviction, 
but rather on defendant's failure to disclose material information, it cannot be said that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. See Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 276. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE 
REQUIREMENT OF A UNANIMOUS VERDICT 
Defendant next contends that it was error for the trial court to give Instruction No. 
13G. Aplt. Brf. at 40. He argues that the instruction violated the principal of jury unanimity 
and thus requires reversal of his conviction. Aplt. Brf. at 43. 
Instruction No. 13G provided: 
You are instructed that while a number of representations and omissions 
are alleged as the basis for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent 
upon the state to prove each and every one of them. It is enough that the state 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a false statement or material omission 
was made in connection with the offer or sale of the security. 
R. 449 (Addendum J). Because defendant did not object to this instruction before it was read 
to the jury, this Court will not address it on appeal absent plain error. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
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19(c); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (holding that the "manifest 
injustice" exception under rule 19 is the same as the plain error exception); see also State v. 
Tenney, 913 P.2d 750,759 (Utah App.), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996).10 To show 
plain error, defendant must demonstrate that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993); accord Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. To show a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome, defendant must demonstrate that the error was "of sufficient magnitude 
that it affects the substantial rights of a party." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. Defendant has 
failed to argue that plain error justifies review of the issue and this Court should therefore 
decline to consider it on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(refusing to consider an unpreserved issue where defendant had not argued plain error on 
appeal). 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim under a plain error analysis, 
defendant fails to meet his burden. Distilled to its essence, defendant's argument is that the 
trial court should have instructed the jury that it must reach a unanimous decision that 
10Defendant challenged the instruction a month after the guilty verdict was 
returned in amended motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment. R. 541, 552. His 
claim that Instruction No. 13G was improper was one of a laundry list of items upon 
which defendant relied on. See R. 541, 552 (alleging that "Jury Instruction No. 13G did 
not provide for jury uninimity [sic] on an element of the crime of securities fraud and thus 
invited the jury to commit error"). R. 541, 552. The trial court, however, does not appear 
to have decided the issue on the merits, noting that many of defendant's claims should 
have been raised at trial. See R. 559. 
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defendant omitted a particular, material fact or that he made a particular, material 
misrepresentation. Regardless of whether the law requires such unanimity, the instructions 
when read together can be fairly read to so provide. See State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391,396 
(Utah App. 1994) (holding that "[j]liry instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole"). 
Instruction No. 13A instructed the jury on the elements of securities fraud as follows: 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime of Securities Fraud 
as charged in Count I of the Second Amended Information, you must find 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of the crime: 
1. That defendant Lee E Walker, 
2. Acting willfully, 
3. On or about October 18, 1994 (although the exact date is 
immaterial), 
4. In connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security, 
5. Directly or indirectly did either of the following: 
(a) Made any untrue statement of a material fact, 
Or 
(b) Omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. 
If you find that the evidence establishes each of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. If you find 
that the evidence fails to establish one or more of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty. 
R. 443 (Addendum J). Lest the jury misinterpreted this instruction, the court advised the jury 
in Instruction 13G "that while a number of representations and omissions are alleged as a 
basis for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove each and 
every one of them." R. 449. This is a correct statement of the law—section 61-1-1 only 
requires the State to prove a single misrepresentation or omission. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-
1-1(2). The instruction further advised the jury that "[i]t is enough that the state prove 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that a false statement or material omission was made in 
connection with the offer or sale of the security." R. 449. This instruction can thus be fairly 
read to require that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either a false 
statement or a material omission. A subsequent instruction, No. 15, then instructed the jury 
that its "verdict must be unanimous" and "represent the careful and conscientious judgment 
of each of and all of you." R. 455 (Addendum J). 
When these instructions are viewed as a whole, they can fairly be read to require that 
the jurors must all agree on the precise manner by which defendant violated the securities 
fraud statute. Therefore, Instruction No. 13G was not like the instruction in State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 58, 992 P.2d 951, wherein the jury was expressly instructed that 
"[t]here is no requirement that the jurors be unanimous about precisely which act occurred 
or when or where the act or acts occurred." The trial court here never gave such an 
instruction. To the contrary, it instructed the jury that its "verdict must be unanimous." R. 
455. The instructions given here were thus even more explicit on the requirement of jury 
unanimity than were those upheld in State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, 20 P.3d 888, which 
appeared to only include an elements instruction. Evans, 2001 UT 22, at f 15 & n.l. The 
court concluded that because the instruction did not "rise to the level of the 'non-unanimity' 
instruction at issue in Saunders,." there was no plain error. Id. at f 17 (footnotes omitted). 
Because the jurors were specifically instructed that their verdict must be unanimous, 
see R. 455, defendant has failed to demonstrate any error, much less plain error and this 
Court should therefore reject his claim. 
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Moreover, any possible confusion in the instructions does not create a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome. As discussed above, there was substantial evidence 
of both misrepresentations and material omissions. Defendant represented on multiple 
occasions that the investment was "okay" and that his client could be trusted notwithstanding 
the fact that "there [is] no such thing" as prime bank instruments and "any use of them [is] 
illegitimate and fraudulent." See R. 488: 217-220, 223-26, 229; R. 489: 55-56, 113-15; R. 
490: 468,477-78; see also R. 489: 49, 51-52, 60, 106. There was also ample evidence that 
defendant never disclosed to Mr. Sorenson that he was subject to a permanent injunction 
involving securities transactions and that he had been sentenced to prison for a criminal 
contempt conviction relating to a securities violation—information that would be important 
to the average investor. See R. 489: 98-100; R. 488: 233, 285-86, 293-96. Indeed, these 
facts were never really contested by defendant. Thus any alleged error would be harmless 
in any event.11 
11
 Moreover, contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, the jury need not all agree 
on the manner by which the crime is committed. Article I, section 10 provides that "[i]n 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous." See Utah Const, art. I, § 10. A majority 
of the Utah Supreme Court has apparently interpreted that provision to require that 
"'unanimity [is] necessary as to all elements of an offense.'" Evans, 2001 UT 22, at f 17 
(quoting Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 61). However, the jury is not required to be 
unanimous as to the manner by which an element is committed, as defendant argues. 
In State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), a plurality of the Utah Supreme 
Court, adopted the Sullivan rule, named after the New York decision in People v. 
Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989 (N.Y. App. 1903). Under the Sullivan rule, "a defendant is not 
entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the crime was committed, 
or by which of several alternative methods or modes, or under which interpretation of the 
evidence so long as there is substantial evidence to support each of the methods, modes, 
or manners charged." Russell, 733 P.2d at 165. Nevertheless, the Sullivan rule has its 
limitations. "If the statute under which the defendant is convicted actually defines more 
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VI. 
THE MANNER BY WHICH THE TRIAL COURT SELECTED THE 
ALTERNATE JUROR DID NOT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT 
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
designated as the alternate juror Juror 6—who stood third in order, rather than Juror 
26—who stood ninth in order. Aplt. Brf. at 43-46. 
Following the jury voir dire, the parties exercised three peremptory challenges each, 
leaving a panel of nine jurors in the following order: Juror 2 (Thomas E. Stokes), Juror 5 
(Jule W. Kreyling), Juror 6 (Jerry Tischner), Juror 8 (Angenette L. Pickette), Juror 9 (Marie 
C. Hansen), Juror 11 (Kelley J. Blake), Juror 13 (Marietta W. Beatty), Juror 20 (Phyllis F. 
Petersen), and Juror 26 (Sharam L. Isam). See R. 424 (Addendum K). Defense counsel 
than one crime and not merely one crime which may be committed in several different 
ways, the defendant is entitled to jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty of 
committing." Id. at 166-67. 
Applying the Sullivan rule to the case here, the jury was not required to all agree 
on the precise manner by which defendant committed the securities fraud. As observed 
by the courts in Pennsylvania, "6[t]he essence of fraud is deceit intentionally and 
successfully practiced to induce another to part with property or with some legal rights.'" 
In re Estate ofDoerr, 565 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 1987) (quoting In re Thome's 
Estate, 25 A.2d 811, 816 (Pa. 1942)). Thus, "fraud comprises 'anything calculated to 
deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of 
what is false, whether by direct falsehood or innuendo, by speech or silence, word of 
mouth, or look or gesture . . . . " Id. (internal quotes omitted). Under section 61-1-1, so 
long as the jury unanimously agrees that defendant committed a deceptive act—whether 
by misrepresenting a material fact or failing to disclose a material fact—the unanimity 
requirement is satisfied. Moreover, it is clear that the statute defines one crime, not two, 
and that under the circumstances here, only one crime was committed. As explained in 
Russell, "'[t]o require unanimity as to the manner of participation would be to frustrate 
the justice system, promote endless jury deliberations, encourage hung juries, and 
precipitate retrials in an effort to find agreement on a nonessential issue.'" Id. at 167-68 
(quoting Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Wis. 1979)). 
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asked the court, in the presence of the jurors, whether Juror 26 would serve as an alternate. 
R. 489: 24. The trial court indicated that it had not yet decided. R. 489: 24. At the 
conclusion of closing arguments, the trial court designated Juror 6 as the alternate juror. R. 
490: 567-68. Defendant voiced an objection, but did not state the reason for the objection. 
R. 490: 568. 
On appeal, defendant argues that pursuant to rules 17 and 18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Juror 26 should have been treated as the alternate juror because he was ninth in 
order of the nine prospective jurors who survived for-cause and peremptory challenges. Aplt. 
Brf. at 44-45. Defendant's final claim lacks merit because he has not alleged or shown any 
real prejudice. 
The law is well settled that Utah's appellate courts will "not interfere with a jury 
verdict because of error or irregularity unless upon review of the entire record it is 
determined that prejudice has occurred in a substantial manner." State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
1338,1352 (Utah 1977). To show prejudice in the selection of the jury, the defendant must 
"show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
398 (Utah 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115,115 S.Ct. 910 (1995). Although Utah courts 
have most frequently required this showing in cases involving a trial court's failure to 
remove a partial juror, that same showing is required in cases involving the improvident 
removal of a juror. Thus, "it is not reversible error to exclude a juror for an insufficient 
cause if an impartial and unobjectionable jury is afterward obtained." State v. Seyboldt, 65 
Utah 204, 236 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1925) (internal quotes omitted). 
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Defendant has not alleged on appeal that anyone serving on the jury was partial or 
otherwise unqualified. See Aplt. Brf. at 43-46. Nor did he so allege below, but passed the 
jury for cause. See R. 489: 13, 15. Defendant does not even allege that the trial court 
harbored an improper motive in "disqualifying" Juror 6. See Aplt. Brf. at 45. Defendant 
simply contends that the manner by which the court selected the alternate juror created "a 
significant potential for abuse." Aplt. Brf. at 45. As discussed, defendant must show actual 
prejudice. See Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1352. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in its 
selection of Juror 6 as the alternate juror, that error is harmless and does not support reversal. 
See Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554,557 (Miss. 1990) (holding that even though the trial court 
did not follow the proper procedure for excusing and replacing a juror, defendant was not 
entitled to reversal because he did not demonstrate prejudice); State v. Griffin, 866 P.2d 
1156, 1163 (N.M. 1993) (refusing to address defendant's claim of error in the trial court's 
replacement of a juror where he did not allege that the alternate juror was unfair or that the 
jury that decided the case was unfair); State v. Kaul, 457 N.W.2d 252,254-55 (Minn. 1990) 
(refusing to reverse a conviction even though the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor 
to exercise a peremptory strike after the trial was completed because defendant previously 
approved the alternate juror). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in point I of the brief, the State respectfully requests the Court 
to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Should this Court find jurisdiction, the State 
requests the Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
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attached Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Lee Walker, by causing them to be 
delivered via first class mail, postage prepaid, to his/her counsel of record, as follows: 
Harold J. Dent, Jr. 
Scarth, Dent & Whiteley, P.C. 
150 North 200 East, Ste. 203 
St. George, UT 84770 
^ 
Je&f&S. Gray f 
Assistant Attorney General 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Utah Const, art L S 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital 
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the 
jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury 
consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury 
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Utah Const, art V, § 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and 
no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1993) 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21(2) (1993) 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 shall upon conviction 
be: 
(a) fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or 
both if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or less; 
(b) fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years or 
both if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth more than $10,000. 
Utah Code Ann, 8 76-3-402 (1995) 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the 
court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered 
to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and 
the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class A 
misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed 
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a 
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of 
justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless 
the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the 
offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced 
under this section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1903 (1990) 
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by financial 
transaction if, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 
represents proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts 
to conduct a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity: 
(a) with intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or 
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to: 
(i) conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
(ii) avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter. 
(2) Money laundering by financial transaction is a second degree felony. 
Addendum B 
Eric A. Ludlow, #5104 
Washington County Attorney 
Brock HBelnap #6179 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
(435) 634-5723 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
LEE E. WALKER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, STAY OF 
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE, 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
Criminal No. 961500684 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for sentencing on the 21* day of 
January, 1999. The State of Utah was represented by David E. Wayment, Utah Division of 
Securities and Brock R. Belnap, Deputy Washington County Attorney. The Defendant, LEE E. 
WALKER, was present and represented by Jim Scarth. The Defendant had previously been 
found guilty at jury trial of COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD, a felony punishable by a fine of 
not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years, and COUNT U: 
MONEY LAUNDERING, a second degree felony. After considering the recommendations of 
counsel for both parties, after having received and read a pre-sentence investigation report from 
the Department of Corrections, and after having reviewed the files and records herein and being 
fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes and enters the following Judgment, Stay of 
Imposition of Sentence and Order of Probation: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LEE E. 
WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD, a felony punishable by 
a fine of not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years and COUNT II: 
MONEY LAUNDERING, a second degree felony. 
STAY OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the imposition of any 
sentence in this matter is stayed. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said Defendant, LEE 
E. WALKER, is hereby placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months, 
strictly within the following terms, provisions and conditions: 
1. That the Defendant be liable for One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in 
restitution to Marc Sorenson jointly and severally with any other defendant convicted of a crime 
in connection with the fraudulent activities resulting in the loss of Marc Sorenson's money; 
provided that, the Defendant shall not be required to pay any money toward restitution until after 
any trial and sentencing of any convicted codefendants; 
2. That the Defendant cooperate fully with Adult Probation and Parole; 
3. That the Defendant have no business activities involving the sale of securities and 
that the Defendant not participate in any manner in any transaction involving the offer or sale of 
securities to any third person; and 
4. The Defendant have no law violations. 
This Court specifically retains jurisdiction over the above cause and over the person of 
said LEE E. WALKER, for the purpose of making such Orders and Judgments or Commitments 
as the same may become necessary or proper. 
DATED this a** day of January, 1999. 
^XV^(^*^^ 
G.RANDBEACHAM 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, Linda Williamson, Clerk of said District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, 
do hereby certify that the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the 
signature of said Judge to said certificate is genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Court 
this O day of fanowy, 1999. 
LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of District Court 
By &L 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that on thiso?? ~ day of January, 1999,1 placed an unexecuted copy 
of the above and foregoing Judgment, Stay of Imposition of Sentence, and Order of Probation in 
the inter-office folder of Jim Scarth, Attorney for Defendant. 
^L 
MARYANN CHARTER, Legal Secretary 
Addendum C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lee Walker, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
AUG \ 9 1999 
COURT Of APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990198-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 19, 1999) 
1999 UT App 241 
Fifth District, St. George Department 
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
Attorneys: Jim R. Scarth, St. George, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Christine Soltis, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson. 
PER CURIAM: 
so tefee trial coi; 
for new trial, 
without authoi&ty 
that we stay this appeal and remand the matter 
may rule on his motions to arrest judgment and 
State does not object. However, we are 
do so. 
% In the Fehrua: 
appeal, the tqtal 
d^endant hafiT ^ " 
or|er. S££ $ W $ ; 
199" 
been 
this cour 
(per curie 
Lacks 
3, 1999, judgment from which Walker seeks to 
rt stayed imposition of sentence. Until a 
entenced, there is no final, appealable 
. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah Ct. App. 
(stating that ,f [b] ecause defendant has not 
appeal was not taken from a final order, and 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal11); State v. 
the 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) (stating that the sentence 
is the final judgment from which an appeal can be taken). 
Because Walker has not been sentenced, there is no final, 
appealable order, and we lack jurisdiction to consider his 
appeal. 
Moreover, because no sentence has been announced Utah R. 
App. P. 4(c), which states that "a notice of appeal filed after 
the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before the 
entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof," does 
not apply. To the contrary, the trial court specifically stayed 
the announcement of sentence. 
Accordingly, we have no alternative but to dismiss Walker's 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal is without 
prejudice to the filing of a new, timely notice of appeal after 
the trial court enters a final, appealable order. 
Micfcaef I f f ^ i T^sT***** 
Presiding Judge 
Addendum D 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lee Walker, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAY 1 8 2000 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000131-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 18, 2000) 
2000 UT App 148 
Fifth District, St. George Department 
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
Attorneys: Harold J. Dent Jr., St, 
Jan Graham and Laura B, 
Appellee 
George, for Appellant 
Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for 
Before i^S^ges Bench, Davis, and Orme. 
*» v 
PER CU$&M: 
? •SsA 
:<S 
ire the court on its own motion for 
thfipgroua^  that the notice of appeal was 
ismiss theoappeal. 
Tais matlW^La he£ 
not timely ^fil^ di >1 
A* nbt^^^^peai^shall" be" filed with the clerk of the 
trial court witnrrx tljirt^ >43ay£c off4sentry of the order appealed 
from. See* Utah RT^App^R. 4 0a$3 ***tJnder this rule, the latest 
possible date orr whjch appellant could have filed his notice of 
appeal from the Jai&uary 14* 2000, order was February 14, 2000. 
The notice of appear was not filed until February 15th, and, 
therefore^—is-untimely. ~ This court lacks jurisdiction over an 
untimely appear, - an<i,~ Accordingly, must dismiss the appeal. See 
Glezog"VT~PionLieT—Inrrr , 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)7 i;JU 
Appellant asserts that the notice of appeal is timely with 
respect to the amended order entered March 1, 2000, which order, 
he argues, replaced the January 14th order. The amended order 
does not enlarge the time for appeal, however, because it does 
not change the substance or character of the original order. 
"[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes 
an amendment or modification not changing the 
substance or character of the judgment, such 
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which 
relates back to the time the original 
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge 
the time for appeal; but where the 
modification or amendment is in some material 
matter, the time begins to run from the time 
of the modification or amendment-" 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citation omitted). In Nielson, the amended order clarifying 
that the prevailing party was entitled to costs in addition to 
the attorney fees already awarded was deemed of insufficient 
importance to change the character of the judgment, and did not 
create a new judgment for purposes of determining the timeliness 
of the appeal. See id. at 133. Similarly, the March 1st order, 
which merely adds an identification of the parties and their 
attorneys, does not affect the substantive rights of the parties 
or change the character of the judgment. Accordingly, it does 
not create a new judgment for purposes of determining the 
timeliness of the notice of appeal. The time in which appellant 
could appeal started to run from the date of th^mmitainal 
judgment, rendering the notice of appeal untimel^E 
/&*# 0. Jg^J. 
Russell sy^fr 
Bench, Judge 
Jame^'Z'. Davis%' Judge 
I, the undersig 
Appeals, do here 
v ^ ^ full, true and corre 
yg^%rr11le in the>Wta& c 
whereof, I ha' 
the Court 
ha D'Alesandro 
Clerk* of Ah^Gourt 
mat 
Zt$Q 
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Addendum E 
SCARTH & DENT 
Harold J. Dent Jr. (0871) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-2884 
FAX: (435) 628-2179 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
LEE E. WALKER, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) AMENDED JUDGMENT 
i Case No. 961500684 
> Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on September 7,2000, pursuant to Defendant's 
Motion to Enter Conviction pursuant to UCA 76-3-402 and to terminate probation. The 
Defendant appeared in person and with counsel Harold J. Dent, Jr. The State was represented by 
Brock Belnap, Deputy Washington County Attorney. After considering the arguments of 
counsel for both parties, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision dated October 24, 2000. 
Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision, the Court hereby enters the following Amended 
Judgment: 
/ / 
' 00 DEC 11 flF) 3 27 
r. v /) l \ C J J N T Y 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LEE E. 
WALKER, is guilty of the offenses of COUNT I: SECURITIES FRAUD, a class A 
misdemeanor and COUNT II: MONEY LAUNDERING, a third degree felony. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that supervised probation 
is terminated and that Defendant, LEE E. WALKER, is hereby placed on bench probation for the 
balance of the original thirty-six month term under the following conditions: 
1. That the Defendant commit no law violations; and 
2. That the Defendant pay restitution as previously ordered, until the issue of 
restitution is resolved. 
This Court specifically retains jurisdiction over the above cause and over the person of 
said LEE E. WALKER, for the purpose of making such Orders and Judgments or Commitments 
as the same may become necessary or proper. 
DATED this D day of December, 2000. 
C\S\^M^)?i)i^ ^ . 
G. RAND BEACHAM 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for the State 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, Susan N. Scott, Clerk of said District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, do 
hereby certify that the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, whose name is subscribed to the preceding 
certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the signature of 
said Judge to said certificate is genuine. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Court 
this / / day of December, 2000. 
SUSAN N. SCOTT, Clerk of District Court 
By <$JZ. 
Deputy Clerk 
Addendum F 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lee Walker, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F!', ED 
Utah Cowrt of Appeals 
DEC 2 8 20Ct 
Panted© Stagg 
Cleft of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20010012-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billing and Davis 
This matter comes before the court on Appellee's motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and request for stay of briefing 
schedule. Appellee contends that the order from which Appellant 
appeals is not a final order. See Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. This 
appeal was originally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because 
the trial courtfs order of February 3, 1999 did not constitute a 
final order. However, the trial court subsequently entered an 
amended judgment on December 8, 2000 and this appeal followed. 
The trial court's order of December 8, 2000 constitutes a final 
appealable order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee's motion to dismiss is 
denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's motion to stay 
briefing is denied. Appellee is to file its brief with this 
court on or before January 18, 2002. 
DATED this 2ft day of December, 2001. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on February 11, 2002, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
HAROLD J. DENT, JR 
SCARTH & DENT 
150 N 200 E #203 
PO BOX 160 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this February 11, 2 002. 
BY _ 
Deputy Clerk 
(U-liiv |Jrt.tiy 
Case No. 20010012-CA 
Addendum G 
OCT-14-1994 12:32 p-ai 
KBMORMDOM OF ONOBMTAMSlTfO 
THIS MEMORANDA o? UNDERSTANDING w U n d into thle 14th day e' October, 
1394, by and betveen VALID 2. SUMMA, a resident of 23997 Pranklin Point. 
Drive, southfi.id, Michigao 48034, hereinafter referred to ! , c l ! m « ! 
Dr. Marc Sorenson 
hereinafter referred to as th« INVESTOR, 
VTHSRSAS, INVESTOR has available unto Masai* funds that can bo dlre«t»d 
to the account ol CLIENT at Bear Steams and to tho deeignated account of 
David B. Suith for tho purpose horain outlined, 
and 
WHEREAS, CLIENT can direct Baar steams to execute on hia behalf delivery 
of Prime Bank Instruments /on a fund-first basis, for sale to buyer* under 
exieting contracts, afltf 
WHEREAS, CLIENT haa available unto himself a commitment tor tha dellbary 
of bank instruments through a World Prime Bank to bring forth their nav 
J*«ue Prime Sank instruments for delivery to a eoatomar/buyer or CLZBKT 
over a period of sixty (60) banking days. 
SOW TUMFOKt, XT IS A01H TEATs 
1. INVESTOR shall arrange for funds to be tent on a bank to bank baaia 
to the designated account of Bear Stearns & Company, Inc.. and the 
account of David B. Smith* A copy of the vira transfer, signed by 
the ban* officer atteetlng to the transfer, shall be transmitted to 
CLIENT. 
2. CLIENT shall direct Bear Stearna to utilize the account for delivery 
of bank instruments under contract to a customer/buyer of CLIENT and 
to execute the transaction on behalf of CLIENT. 
3. INVESTOR ahail arrange the transfer of .Qeafwwea>« Thousand Dollars 
(t|^=©o«>roc) to tne account of Bear Stearna at Citibank N.T., and 
$50^000 to David B. Smith at Palm Beach Natl. Bank & Trust 
to the account of Davie B. smith at Palm Beach National Bank pursuant 
to the following bank coordinatesi 
BANK NAME ' CITIBANK 
BANK ADDRESS t 111 HALL STREET, NEW YORK N.T. 
A.B.A. NUMBER « 021-000089 
FOR CREDIT TO * BEAR STEARNS * COKPANT, INC. 
ACCOUNT NUMBER » 09233186 
FOR FURTHER CREDIT TO i HRRCAMTXLB INYBSTMZWT GEOOP, INC. 
ACCOUNT NUMBER i 219-04026-1-4 
TOR FURTHER CREDIT TO » ACCOUNT NUMBER* RH-310 
BANK NAME ? PALM BEACH NATIONAL BANK « TRUST CO. 
A.B.A NUMBER « 067008647 
FOR CREDIT TO » DAVID B. SMITH 
ACCOUNT NUMBER « 110036261 
CCT-14-1994 12:33 P.02 
KotoiAxoBH or tmunsruxoim 
page -2-
4. Xn consideration of the services rendered by I M Y M T O R « T T C M »«»*.. 
t l M hi* invoetaent *nd «4id amount shall b. di.bjrlid U the ban* 
account of INVESTOR under the following tarae and coJditionii 
One point tvo five times <1.25) INVESTOR'* investment shall t» «»4«f 
One point tvo five tines (1.25) INVESTOR'* investment shall be paid 
«««nty <20) b.nlcing days after the Initial payment, 
5. CLIENT agrees to direct Bear Steam* to Ueue a receipt to INVISTO* 
for the funds received into their account on behalf of their client. 
6. CLIENT and INVESTOR further agree that an executed facelmlle of thie 
docu«*«it shall be considered an original, legally binding In any or 
all Jurisdiction*. 
?. The mies and regulations of non-circuarrration/non-dlscioaura pf the 
international chamber of Commerce, Paris, rranee, latest edition*, 
is Bade part of this Memorandum of Understanding. 
8. In the event of any dispute, the parties herein agres to enter into 
Binding arbitration, and any decision rendered by arbitration may be 
entered as a judgement in any international court of lav. 
WALID Z. SCMHA INVESTOR 
FROM: Mountain America Credit Union 
Salt lake City, Utah 
ABA No. 32407955-6 
RECEIVED 
FEDUNE WIRE TRANSFER WORKSHEET *pR \ \ 1996 
Ospt ot Comnww 3w. of Seturths 
Pat* JO-IX-^ Time; ?.</S" 
Amount: fOO.am<& JUL .Fee 
FOR: Member's Name:. Member's Phone No.: _£<2£r£Z2£. 
TO: Financial institution 3<^»> Jvi^t/t^I^JbL £*>**& a-/. Li2ur 
ABA No.: / , 3 / O / V ^ - / 9 and/or Phone No. / - 7 ^ - 3 ? 5 - ^ ^ 
Credit to: ^* / CthMrt} Qtifant«i Acct. No. Q2£ACd£Z& Attn.: 
Credit to: •dA.«*.f -&404*. T" Acct. No. Attn.: 
internal Use Only: 
Type: Password:. Cash(GL91110) Fee<GL93442) TV No.: 
TO: Mountain America Credit Union 
„ hereby eutwrtze Mountain Amencs Cradt Union to 
withdraw A^^aa^ plus* M/*- fee from my account No. J/**7*^ 
(savings, checking^ invostmsnt)swift cash). Please make the funds payable to: 
Signed: 
(Membar/Jcifft Owner) 
Poet-it" Fax Note 7671 
To /rttifo^ "^miA^o*! 
CoJOe**. 
Ptwe# 
Fax* (*&-ten 
°*1LJ±S2LJS£--L. 
From Ji f<«w^ 
°°- ^ a**** rui 
pnone* 
Fax# 
32S-<#33fr 
? / -n-^^5 
JUH 2 9 1992 
OFFiCSCF J1'"•-£_ 
J. "h i - . ^ ^ ' - -,iC-
Jennifer J. Ausenbaugh (Bar No. 3914) 
John L. Hunter 
Pat Conti 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
500 Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0402 
Telephone: (801) 524-5796 
*>-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
\ 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BLAINE C. TAYLOR, 
RAY A. WARREN, 
LEE A. WALKER, 
ELLIOTT R. PEARSON, 
SILVER BARON, INC., 
GARY R. LITTLER, 
DAVID M. LAMOREAUX, 
WARREN & BROWN 
ASSOCIATES, INC., and 
JAMES A. FOSTER, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 88-C-619 G 
FINAL JUDGMENT OF 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
AS TO LEE A. 
WALKER 
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") 
having duly commenced this action by filing its Complaint for 
Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (the "Complaint") 
and Defendant, Lee A. Walker ("Walker"), in his Consent and 
Undertakings (the "Consent") having entered a general appearance, 
having admitted to the jurisdiction of the Court over him and over 
the subject matter of this action, having waived the entry of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and without admitting or 
denying the allegations of the Complaint, except as to jurisdiction 
to which he admits, having consented to the entry of this Final 
Judgment of Permanent Injunction (the "Final Judgment"), and it 
further appearing that this Court has jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter hereof, the Court being fully advised in the 
premises: 
I 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Walker, his 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys-in-fact, and those persons 
in active concert or participation with them who receive actual 
notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, and each of 
them, hereby is permanently enjoined, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails or any facility 
of any national securities exchange, from: 
2 
C. engaging in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security in 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
[15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] 
thereunder. 
There being no just reason for delay, the Clerk of the Court 
is hereby directed, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to enter this Final Judgment forthwith. 
DATED: June L~ \ 1992 %A 
JQQM+< 
TATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
I herebv carafy that the annexed document is a true 
and ccrrect copy of the original on file in this office 
ATTEST; MARKUS B. ZJMMER 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
June 30, 1992 
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * * 
*: 2:88-cv-00619 
rue and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the 
Dllowing: 
David R. King, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Clark W Sessions, Esq. 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 S Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Robert Meredith, Esq. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
V. 
LEE WALKER 
601 South Stonehill Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 89106 
C0L0HAD0 AMENDED 
Fl L E S = 
iMTED STATES DISTSICTC* 
PENVER. COLC^CO 
JA\i£S R. MANSPEAKER 
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
Case Number: 87-CR-389-2 
(Name and Address of Defendant) 
THE DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF: 
David R. King and Thomas Bovle 
Attorney for Defendant 
[ZX guilty Z nolo contendere] as to ggMH^ s) the Criminal Contempt Charge 
• not guilty as to count(s) 
and 
THERE WAS^A: 
[Z3c finding j verdict] of guilty as to gaocRt^ s) rhe Criminal Contempt Charge 
THERE WAS^A: 
[C finding L_, verdict] of not guilty as to count(s). 
• judgment of acquittal as to count(s). 
The defendant is acquitted and discharged as to this/these count(s). 
THE DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED OF THE OFFENSE(S) OF: criminal contempt of court in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). 
T IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT: the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the 
Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for a term of six months. 
It is further ordered that the defendant may voluntarily surrender to the designated 
institution by May 30, 1988. 
•^NALON^JSyllSSrCf 
wSBffiffiitf*™ 005003 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION' 
Whe re probation has been ordered the defendant sha I 
n rpfram from violation of any law (federal state and local) and get in touch immediately with your probation officer f ar^es'ed or 
questioned by a law enforcement officer 
(2) associate only with law abiding persons and maintain reasonable hours 
(3) */ork rpgularly at a lawful occupation and suoport your legal dependents if any to the best of /our ability (When out c f vo k -^ o* fy 
/our probation officer at once and consult him prior to job changes) 
(4) not lea^e the judicial district without permission of the probation officer 
(5» ~oti'y your probation officer immediately of any changes in your place of residence 
(6) follow the probation officer s instructions and report as d rected 
The court may change the conditions of probation 'educe or expend the period of probation and at any time during the orobation po»* od 
or within the maximum probation period of 5 years permitted by law may issue a warrant and revoke probation for a violation occurr no, 
during the probation period 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay a total special assessment of $ 
pursuant to Title 18, U S C Section 3013 fo rcount (s )_ as follows 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT counts are DISMISSED 
on the motion of the United States 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay to the United States attorney for this district any amount 
imposed as a fine, restitution or special assessment The defendant shall pay to the clerk of the court any 
amount imposed as a cost of prosecution Until ail fines restitution, special assessments and costs are fully 
paid the defendant shall immediately notify the United States attorney for this district of any change in name 
and address 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court deliver a certified copy of this judgment to the United 
States marshal of this district 
IX The Court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends t h a t t h e designated 
inst i tut ion be at Lompoc, CA. 
, 198$ 
^jii-<J2^Ut^ 
Officer 
'A L. WEINSHIENK. Judge, U.S. District Court 
le and Title of Judicial Officer 
May , 1988 
Date 
have executed this Judgment as follows 
RETURN 
Dftfpnriantdfl lMHh^gf ^ & * t * $ & to V ^ U ^ Y > * C_ at 
SSflW i K Date 
1 .j^'^Sxl ^ C ^ " " the institution designated by the Attorney 
General with a certified copy of thrs-SOdgraent in a Criminal Case 
h c.^ x 0 ; \ c> ? cx>iViM-./x. 
:JJ^4s4-SjQtC3 Marohal , 
Addendum H 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
LEE E. WALKER, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Criminal No. 961500684 
i Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment and 
Motion for New Trial, both of which were originally filed June 18, 1999. Amended motions were 
filed November 24,1999, and the Court heard oral argument on December 2, 1999. These motions 
present both procedural and substantive issues. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Defendant was found guilty of Securities Fraud and of Money Laundering by a jury verdict 
rendered October 21, 1998. A sentencing hearing was held January 21, 1999, at which the Court 
stayed imposition of sentence and ordered Defendant to complete supervised probation. The Court's 
"Judgment, Stay of Imposition of Sentence, and Order of Probation" was prepared by Plaintiffs 
counsel and entered by the Court on February 3, 1999. Defendant's motions were thereafter filed, 
as noted above. 
Plaintiff argues that both of Defendant's motions are untimely. Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to file a motion for arrest of judgment at "any time prior to 
the imposition of sentence." Rule 24 of the same rules allows a defendant to file a motion for new 
trial "within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix 
during the ten-day period." 
Plaintiff argues that imposition of Defendant's sentence occurred no later than the date on 
which the "Judgment, Stay of Imposition of Sentence, and Order of Probation" was entered,1 so that 
Defendant's Rule 23 motion was not filed before imposition of sentence and Defendant's Rule 24 
motion was not filed within ten days after imposition of sentence. Defendant primarily notes that the 
Court stayed the imposition of sentence, so that imposition of sentence has not occurred. 
The Court's oral order at the sentencing hearing and its written order both specified that 
imposition of sentence as to Defendant was to be "stayed."2 Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(2)(a) gives 
the Court discretion to suspend imposition of sentence and place a defendant on probation without 
imposing sentence: "On a . . . conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the 
imposition . . . of sentence and place the defendant on probation." Plaintiff relies on Rule 22(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, which states that, after conviction of a criminal 
offense, "the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction . . . ." Plaintiff 
correctly notes that the language of this rule appears to be mandatory. 
Read literally, however, Rule 22(c) would eliminate the discretion to suspend imposition of 
sentence which is created by the statute and would render the statute meaningless. Plaintiff does not 
1Plaintiff mistakenly states that the date was March 3, 1999. 
2This Court has previously "stayed" imposition of sentence in appropriate cases, but now notes that the 
statutory term is "suspend." Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(2)(a). The Court will endeavor to use the statutory term in 
future cases, but, due to the history of this case, must use both terms in this decision. 
2 
take the rule entirely literally, but does argue that this Court's order staying the imposition of 
sentence was, in spite of the clear language of the order, actually the imposition of sentence. This 
Court is not persuaded to accept this verbal sleight of hand. Neither was the Court of Appeals, in 
its August 19, 1999 Memorandum Decision remitting this case back to this Court; the Court of 
Appeals noted that this Court had "stayed imposition of sentence" and stated that "[Defendant] has 
not been sentenced." The Court of Appeals correctly stated the facts, and this Court is not persuaded 
that, by some process of alchemy, those facts constitute the imposition of sentence. 
The Court concludes that Rule 22(c) and §77-18-l(2Xa) are simply in conflict, and that the 
Utah Legislature and the Utah Supreme Court have failed to identify and correct this problem. 
Neither of the parties to this action has analyzed this conflict or provided the Court with any statutory 
or rule-making history upon which the Court could base a decision as to which of the conflicting 
statements of law should be prevailing. Furthermore, in the absence of adequate research by the 
parties, this Court currently has no law clerk to do the necessary research and has no available time 
to do it personally. 
On the other hand, the Court has been given no reason to believe that the adoption of Rule 
22(c) was intended to eliminate the well-established concept of suspended imposition of sentence, 
in spite of the statement of Rule 1(c) that statutes and rules in conflict with the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure are "repealed."3 Consequently, the Court will assume that the conflict between the rule 
3Statutes and rules are not properly "repealed" by the simple adoption of new ones and the inclusion of 
such a "dragnet" statement as Rule 1(c). The problems in Rules 1(c), 22(c), 23 and 24 all appear, to this Court, to 
have resulted from inattentive or incompetent draftsmanship. Unfortunately, this is not uncommon in the drafting 
of rules and statutes in the State of Utah. 
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and the statute was inadvertent, and will interpret Rule 22(c) to mean that the Court "shall impose 
sentence or order a suspension of the imposition of sentence." In this way, the statutory discretion 
to suspend imposition of sentence is preserved. 
The Court's order at the sentencing hearing and in writing was a stay or suspension of 
imposition of sentence, and not the actual imposition of sentence. With this in mind, Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial under Rule 24 was not filed too late, because imposition of sentence has not 
yet occurred4 Similarly, Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment under Rule 23 was filed before 
imposition of sentence, which was timely filing Consequently, both motions must be considered. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Rule 24 allows the Court to "grant a new trial in the interest of justice of there is any error 
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse eflfect upon the rights of a party." Defendant relies 
primarily upon allegations of error or impropriety by the prosecution which were raised and ruled 
upon during the trial, but also relies upon issues which were, or should have been, raised and ruled 
upon before trial The Court finds nothing in Defendant's current arguments to justify additional 
analysis or discussion, and finds that the arguments in Plaintiffs opposing memorandum are 
substantially correct. See Plaintiffs "Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for New Trial 
and Motion for Arrest of Judgment," pp. 11-15 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
4
 In addition, the Court concludes that the Motion for New Trial was not filed too early; the Court has been 
given no reason to conclude that the time limit of Rule 24, "within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within 
such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period," was mtended to fix a ten-day window as the only 
time in which such a motion may be filed. 
4 
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
Rule 23 allows the Court to "arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute 
a public oflFense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment." Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment is based on exactly the same assertions as 
his Motion for New Trial, and concludes that "the Judgment herein should be arrested and 
convictions vacated." 
The "Judgment herein" is the Judgment included in the "Judgment, Stay of Imposition of 
Sentence, and Order of Probation" entered on February 3,1999. In that Judgment, the Court found, 
adjudged and decreed that Defendant was guilty of the two criminal offenses noted above. The 
"arrest of judgment" would involve "[t]he act of staying a judgment." Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth 
Edition. "A stay is a suspension of the case or some designated proceedings within i t . . . . A 'stay' 
does not reverse, annul, undo or suspend what already had been done . . . ." Id Consequently, 
granting Defendant's motion would stay the enforcement of, and any action based on, the Judgment 
against Defendant, pending new charges, new trial or other proceedings. See Rule 23. 
Defendant does not claim to be mentally ill, so it is Defendant's burden to demonstrate that 
the facts proved or admitted against Defendant do not constitute a public offense or there is other 
good cause to arrest the Judgment. To do so, of course, the Court would have to "invade the 
province of the jury" and determine that the evidence could not support the jury's verdict and that 
the verdict was legally incorrect. The courts generally are willing to do so only in extreme cases, of 
course, because the right to trial by jury would otherwise be threatened. One expression of the 
judicial reluctance to overturn a jury verdict is that, before a court should grant a motion to arrest a 
5 
judgment which was based on a jury verdict, the court must be convinced that "the verdict [was] 
based on evidence 'so inherently improbable that no reasonable mind could believe it.'" State v. 
Workman. 806 P.2d 1198, (Utah App. 1991). In addition, the court considering such a motion 
must view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
In oral argument, Defendant's counsel cited the Court to several pages of the trial transcript 
to demonstrate that Defendant' s convictions were based on such inherently improbable evidence. The 
Court has reviewed those pages and many others, without reading the entire transcript. The Court 
also heard all of the evidence at the trial, of course. After viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the Court is not persuaded that the evidence on which the jury could 
have relied is inherently improbable. The Court finds that PlaintiflF presented evidence which, if 
believed by the jury, is clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty on each of the two 
charges against Defendant. 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of Defendant's motions is denied. Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby directed to submit an 
appropriate order pursuant to CJA Rule 4-504. 
DATED this Q day of January, 2000. 
G. RAND BEACHAM 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this C? day of January, 2000,1 provided a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the attorneys named below by placing a 
copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah: 
Brock Belnap 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
David H. T. Wayment 
Special Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Jim R. Scarth 
Scarth & Dent 
DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*6
 Pr} 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE E. WALKER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Criminal No. 961500684 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on September 7, 2000 pursuant to Defendant's "Motion 
to Enter Conviction Pursuant to UC A 76-3-402 and to Terminate Probation," which was filed August 
31, 2000. Defendant asked for a hearing too soon to allow Plaintiff to respond pursuant to normal 
rules, but Plaintiffs counsel appeared at the hearing without objection and made arguments. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 21, 1998, a jury found Defendant guilty of Securities Fraud and Money 
Laundering. Securities Fraud is "a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $20,000 and/or 
imprisonment of not more than ten years," and Money Laundering is a second degree felony. On 
January 21, 1999, this Court stayed imposition of sentence and placed Defendant on supervised 
probation for 36 months. One of the terms of Defendant's probation was that he pay restitution in 
the amount of $ 100,000, jointly and severally with all other co-defendants, but without any obligation 
to pay any amount until after any trial and sentencing of any convicted co-defendants. There has 
never been any allegation that Defendant has violated the terms of his probation, although the 
^
n 
.-</> 
compact of Defendant's probation to the state of his residence, Nevada, has not been particularly 
successful. This, however, is not attributable to Defendant. 
Defendant now asks this Court to reduce Defendant's convictions to misdemeanors pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402, to terminate Defendant's probation, and to fix Defendant's restitution 
obligation at $5000. Plaintiff does not object to a reduction of Defendant's convictions by one 
degree, but refuses to consent to a reduction of two degrees. Neither Plaintiff nor Adult Probation 
and Parole objects to termination of Defendant's probation, except for a concern that financial 
information about Defendant was not obtained through supervision. Plaintiff objects to a change of 
Defendant's restitution obligation. 
REDUCTION OF CONVICTIONS 
At Defendant's sentencing hearing, this Court expressed its findings as to Defendant's 
culpability in comparison with other persons involved in the events which led to Defendant's 
convictions. Considering the nature and circumstances of Defendant's offenses, this Court still finds 
that Defendant has the least culpability of any of those persons involved in the illegal transactions, 
and still finds that Defendant received no profit or benefit from the illegal transactions. The only co-
defendant who was charged in this jurisdiction, David Smith, has never reached the trial of his 
charges, even though his alleged culpability is much greater than Defendant' s; after several delays due 
to changes in Smith's legal counsel, the trial scheduled earlier this month was again continued due 
to the hospitalization of Smith's appointed attorney. Consequently, Defendant has been convicted 
and has served nearly two years of probation, while his co-defendant still awaits trial. This Court also 
finds that Defendant's history and character, though not as spotless as might be hoped, are such that 
2 
his motion should be seriously considered. Having considered all the information available, this Court 
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record Defendant's convictions for the degree of offense 
established by statute. To this extent, Plaintiff does not seriously disagree. 
Plaintiff refuses to consent to a reduction more than one degree, however. Plaintiffs consent 
is necessary for a reduction of Defendant's offenses to misdemeanors, under the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-402(3), which provides 
An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless 
the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record 
that the offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an 
offense be reduced under this section by more than two degrees. 
Defendant asks this Court to find that this statute violates the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers, by allowing the prosecutor, who serves in the executive branch of government, 
to control a judicial decision about sentencing. This argument has a superficial appeal, because this 
Court would in fact order the reduction of Defendant's convictions to class A misdemeanors, but for 
the prosecutor's refusal to consent. Defendant provided the Court with only a cursory argument in 
support of his motion, however, and cited no specific precedent. Plaintiff simply argued that the 
statute should be respected, but has cited only non-controlling precedents on somewhat related issues. 
Upon consideration of Defendant's motion, this Court assigned its law clerk to research the 
issue. There appears to be no controlling precedent in this State, but the law clerk has identified 
several decisions from sister states which bear on the issue. In the view of this Court, the best 
reasoning comes from Arizona and California, which have both held that a statute which requires the 
prosecutor's assent before an offense is reduced does violate the separation of powers doctrine. In 
3 
State v. Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App. 1984), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the 
Legislature 
cannot give the prosecuting attorney, after a conviction, [the power] to decide what 
the punishment shall be. That is a judicial function. [The Arizona statute] was enacted 
to mitigate the punishment prescribed by §28-692.01(B) and the decision to mitigate 
a sentence properly belongs to the judge and not to the prosecutor. 
Id. Further, in State v. Prentiss. 786 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1989), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld 
Jones, stating that Jones made it clear that it is unconstitutional to limit a judge's ability to impose 
a mitigated sentence to instances in which the prosecutor makes a post-trial "recommendation." They 
stated: "The cornerstone upon which Jones is predicated is that the legislature cannot, through an 
executive agent, restrict the judiciary from deciding what a sentence should be." JjL at 935. 
The Arizona court recognized that a prosecutor has complete discretion in deciding what 
charge to bring, but held that "once the legislature provides the court with the power to use 
sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by 
empowering the executive branch to review that discretion." Id. See also, State v. Dvkes. 789 P.2d 
1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (requiring motion by prosecutor before judge could apply lesser sentence 
unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers doctrine). 
In California, the courts have mainly focused on the fact that, although prosecutors have 
discretion to determine what crime to charge, that is the extent of their discretion. They do not hold 
the same power after a conviction has been obtained. In People v. Tenorio. 473 P.2d 993, 3 Cal.3d 
89 (Cal. 1970), the California Supreme Court addressed a statutory provision which gave the district 
attorney the power to preclude a trial court from exercising its discretion to strike a prior offense for 
4 
the purposes of sentencing. In that setting, in which the district attorney's "veto" power was 
exercised at the sentencing phase, well after the filing of the charges, the court concluded that such 
an exercise violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court explained: 
The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that 
a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to 
exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he 
must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be 
independent, and a Judge should never be required to pay for its 
exercise. 
Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d at 94. See also, Estevbar v. Municipal Court, 485 P.2d 1140, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (Cal. 
1971); Davis v. Municipal Court, 757 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1988) (following Tenorio and Estevbar): People 
v. Superior Court, 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974) (striking down statute giving prosecutor veto power 
over trial court's decision to sentence defendant to diversion program). 
This Court finds the reasoning in the Arizona and California cases to be very sound and 
persuasive. There is no similar precedent in Utah, however. Furthermore, the state of the principle 
of separation of powers in Utah is, to this Court, impossible to assess. The competing decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court in In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998) and In re 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581 have left this Court with serious doubt as to 
the viability of the separation of powers principle. Finally, decisions as to the constitutionality of 
statutes are generally appropriate and meaningful only in the appellate courts. 
Consequently, this Court declines to hold that Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402 is an 
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers principle, but encourages Defendant to appeal 
this issue to obtain a definitive decision. This Court grants Defendant's motion to reduce his 
5 
convictions one degree, and directs counsel for Defendant to submit an appropriate order. 
TERMINATION OF PROBATION; RESTITUTION 
Due to the absence of allegations of probation violations, and without objection from Plaintiff 
or Defendant's probation agent, this Court grants Defendant's motion to terminate his supervised 
probation. Defendant will remain on bench probation, however, with obligations to violate no laws 
and to pay restitution as previously ordered, until the issue of restitution is resolved. This Court 
denies Defendant's motion to reduce his restitution obligation, but may reconsider such a motion after 
the resolution of the charges against the co-defendant, David Smith. Counsel for Defendant is hereby 
directed to submit an appropriate order. 
DATED thifr^M day of October, 2000. 
(S^y^ fc*v. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this £& day oiQcX , 2000,1 provided a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the parties/attorneys named below by 
placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. 
George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and 
addressed as follows: 
Brock Belnap 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
David Wayment 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Harold J. Dent, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant 
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT 
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Addendum J 
INSTRUCTION NO. Vb& 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime of Securities Fraud as charged in Count 
I of the Second Amended Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable coubt, 
all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That the defendant Lee E Walker, 
2. Acting willfully, 
3 On or about October 18, 1994 (although the exact date is immaterial), 
4. In connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security, 
5. Directly or indirectly did either of the following: 
(a) Made any untrue statement of a material fact, 
Or 
(b) Omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading. 
If you find that the evidence establishes each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. If you find that the evidence fails to establish one or more 
of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1 ^ 
You are instructed that while a number of representations and omissions are alleged as 
the basis for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove each and 
every one of them. It is enough that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a false 
statement or material omission was made in connection with the offer or sale of the security. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of yourselves to act as the chairperson 
to preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you all agree. The chairperson has 
no more power than any other juror. 
In this criminal case your verdict must be unanimous. You may not reach a verdict by 
drawing straws, by flipping a coin or by a majority vote. Instead, your verdict must represent the 
careful and conscientious judgment of each of you and all of you. 
Your verdict must be in writing, and it must be returned to the court. A verdict form has been 
prepared for your use in this case. Your chairperson will sign that verdict which correctly sets forth 
your decision. It is not necessary for anyone other than the chairperson to sign your verdict. 
When you have arrived at a verdict, the chairperson should knock on the door to the jury 
room to notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the court. 
Addendum K 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH LEE WALKER 
Plaintiff VS Defendant 
David Wayment/Brock Belnap J. Scarth 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Case No. 
961500684 
DATE 
JURY LIST 
Attorney for Defendant 
10/19/98 
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